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467 U. S.

THREE AFFILIATED TRIBES OF THE FORT
BERTHOLD RESERVATION v. WOLD
ENGINEERING, P. C., ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH DAKOTA
No. 82-629.

Argued November 29, 1983-Decided May 29, 1984

The North Dakota statute (Chapter 27-19) governing the Indian civil jurisdiction of the state courts provides that jurisdiction shall extend "over all
civil causes of action which arise on an Indian reservation upon acceptance by Indian citizens." North Dakota's Enabling Act provides that all
Indian land "shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of
Congress." Petitioner Indian Tribe, which had not accepted state civil
jurisdiction under Chapter 27-19, employed respondent Wold Engineering (hereafter respondent) to design and build a water-supply system on
petitioner's reservation in North Dakota. When the project was completed, it did not perform to petitioner's satisfaction, and petitioner sued
respondent in a North Dakota state court for negligence and breach of
contract. At the time suit was filed, petitioner's tribal court did not
have jurisdiction over a claim by an Indian against a non-Indian in the
absence of an agreement by the parties. Although the subject matter of
petitioner's complaint was within the general scope of the state court's
jurisdiction, that court granted respondent's motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction
over any claim arising in Indian country, including a claim by an Indian
against a non-Indian. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. Interpreting Chapter 27-19 to disclaim state-court jurisdiction over a claim
against a non-Indian by an Indian tribe that had not accepted jurisdiction
under the statute, the court determined that the North Dakota Legislature had disclaimed jurisdiction pursuant to the federal statute (Pub. L.
280) governing state jurisdiction over Indian country and that such disclaimer, because it had been authorized by Pub. L. 280, did not violate
either the North Dakota or Federal Constitution. The court rejected
petitioner's argument that the jurisdiction that it had recognized in Vermillion v. Spotted Elk, 85 N. W. 2d 432-wherein it was held that the
existing jurisdictional disclaimers in the State's Enabling Act and Constitution foreclosed civil jurisdiction over Indian country only in cases involving interests in Indian lands themselves-had not been extinguished
altogether and that the North Dakota courts possessed "residuary jurisdiction" over a claim by an Indian against a non-Indian following the enactment of Pub. L. 280 and the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which amended
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Pub. L. 280 to require that all subsequent assertions of jurisdiction be
preceded by tribal consent. The court also rejected petitioner's argument that to prohibit a suit such as petitioner's would violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and deny petitioner
equal access to the courts in violation of the North Dakota Constitution.
Held:
1. No federal law or policy required the North Dakota courts to
forgo in this case the jurisdiction recognized in Vermillion, supra.
Pp. 147-151.
(a) The exercise of state-court jurisdiction in this case would not interfere with the right of tribal Indians to govern themselves under their
own laws. As a general matter, tribal self-government is not impeded
when a State allows an Indian to seek relief against a non-Indian concerning a claim arising in Indian country. The exercise of state jurisdiction is particularly compatible with tribal autonomy when, as here, the
suit is brought by the tribe itself and the tribal court lacked jurisdiction
over the claim at the time the suit was instituted. Pp. 147-149.
(b) Nor would the exercise of state jurisdiction here be inconsistent
with the federal and tribal interests reflected in North Dakota's Enabling Act or in Pub. L. 280. The legislative record suggests only that
the Enabling Act's phrase "absolute [congressional] jurisdiction and control" was meant to foreclose state regulation and taxation of Indians and
their lands, not that Indians were to be prohibited from entering state
courts to pursue judicial remedies against non-Indians. Public Law 280
does not either require North Dakota to disclaim the basic jurisdiction
recognized in Vermillion or authorize it to do so. Nothing in Pub. L.
280's language or legislative history indicates that it was meant to divest States of pre-existing and otherwise lawfully assumed jurisdiction.
Pp. 149-151.
2. Where it is uncertain whether the North Dakota Supreme Court's
interpretation of Chapter 27-19 rested on a misconception of federal law,
its judgment will be vacated, and the case will be remanded to that court
for reconsideration of the state-law question. Pp. 151-158.
(a) The court's incorrect assumption that Pub. L. 280 and the Civil
Rights Act of 1968 either authorized North Dakota to disclaim jurisdiction or affirmatively forbade the exercise of jurisdiction absent tribal
consent appears to have been the sole basis relied upon by the court to
avoid holding the jurisdictional disclaimer unconstitutional as applied in
this case. Pp. 154-155.
(b) The manner in which the court rejected the availability of
"residuary jurisdiction" leaves open the possibility that, despite the
court's references to state law, it regarded federal law as an affirmative
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bar to the exercise of jurisdiction here and interpreted state law to avoid
a perceived conflict. Pp. 155-157.
(c) The conclusion that the North Dakota Supreme Court's statelaw decision may have rested on federal law is buttressed by prudential
considerations. If that court is not given an opportunity to reconsider
its conclusions with the proper understanding of federal law, this Court,
contrary to the fundamental rule that it will not reach constitutional
questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them, will be required
to decide whether North Dakota has denied petitioner equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 157-158.
321 N. W. 2d 510, vacated and remanded.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,
C. J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ.,
joined. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS, J.,
joined, post, p. 159.

Raymond Cross argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs was John 0. Holm.
Deputy Solicitor General Claiborne argued the cause for
the United States as amicus curiae in support of petitioner.
With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney General Habicht, and Edwin S. Kneedler.
Hugh McCutcheon argued the cause for respondents and
filed a brief for respondent Wold Engineering, P. C.*
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This litigation presents issues of state-court civil jurisdiction over a claim asserted by an Indian tribe. The case, as it
comes to us, is somewhat unusual in a central respect: the

Tribe seeks, rather than contests, state-court jurisdiction,
and the non-Indian party is in opposition. Cf. Williams v.
Lee, 358 U. S. 217 (1959).
Chapter 27-19 of the North Dakota Century Code (1974) is
entitled "Indian Civil Jurisdiction." Section 27-19-01 of that
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Standing Rock
Sioux Tribe et al. by Reid Peyton Chambers; and for the Turtle Mountain
Band of Chippewa Indians by Kim Jerome Gottschalk and Richard B.
Collins.
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Code provides that the jurisdiction of North Dakota courts
shall extend "over all civil causes of action which arise on an
Indian reservation upon acceptance by Indian citizens." In
this case, the Supreme Court of North Dakota interpreted
Chapter 27-19 to disclaim state-court jurisdiction over a
claim (against a non-Indian) by an Indian Tribe that had not
accepted jurisdiction under the statute. The court determined that the North Dakota Legislature had disclaimed jurisdiction pursuant to the principal federal statute governing
state jurisdiction over Indian country, namely, the Act of
Aug. 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 588, as amended, 28 U. S. C. § 1360,
commonly known as Pub. L. 280. The court further concluded that the jurisdictional disclaimer, inasmuch as it was
authorized by Pub. L. 280, did not run afoul of the North
Dakota or Federal Constitutions. Because the North Dakota
Supreme Court's interpretation of Chapter 27-19 and its
accompanying constitutional analysis appear to us to rest on
a possible misunderstanding of Pub. L. 280, we vacate the
court's judgment and remand the case to allow reconsideration of the jurisdictional questions in the light of what we
feel is the proper meaning of the federal statute.
I
A. Petitioner Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold
Reservation is a federally recognized Indian Tribe with its
reservation in northwestern North Dakota. Act of Mar. 3,
1891, ch. 543, §23, 26 Stat. 1032. See City of New Town v.
United States, 454 F. 2d 121 (CA8 1972). In 1974, petitioner
employed respondent Wold Engineering, P. C. (hereafter
respondent), a North Dakota corporation, to design and
build the Four Bears Water System Project, a water-supply
system located wholly within the reservation. The project
was completed in 1977 but it did not perform to petitioner's
satisfaction.
In 1980, petitioner sued respondent in a North Dakota
state court for negligence and breach of contract. At the
time the suit was filed, petitioner's tribal court did not have
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jurisdiction over a claim by an Indian against a non-Indian in
the absence of an agreement by the parties. Tribal Code,
ch. II, § 1(a).' The subject matter of petitioner's complaint,
however, clearly fell within the scope of the state trial court's
general jurisdiction. See N. D. Const., Art. VI, §8; N. D.
Cent. Code § 27-05-06 (1974 and Supp. 1983). After counterclaiming for petitioner's alleged failure to complete its payments on the water-supply system, respondent moved to dismiss petitioner's complaint on the ground that the trial court
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over any claim arising in
Indian country.
B. At this point, in order to place respondent's jurisdictional argument in perspective, it is desirable to review the
somewhat erratic course of federal and state law governing
North Dakota's jurisdiction over the State's Indian reservations. Long before North Dakota became a State, this
Court had recognized the general principle that Indian territories were beyond the legislative and judicial jurisdiction of
state governments. Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515 (1832);
see generally Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S., at 218-222. That
principle was reflected in the federal statute that granted
statehood to North Dakota. Like many other other States
in the Midwest and West,2 North Dakota was required to
"disclaim all right and title ...

to all lands lying within [the

State] owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes" as a condition for admission to the Union. Enabling Act of Feb. 22,
1889, §4, cl. 2, 25 Stat. 677. The Act further provided that
all such Indian land shall "remain subject to the disposition
of the United States, and ...

shall remain under the abso-

lute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United
IFollowing the North Dakota Supreme

Court's decision in this case, peti-

tioner's Tribal Business Council amended the Tribal Code to grant the
tribal court subject-matter jurisdiction over all civil causes of action arising
within the boundaries of the Fort Berthold Reservation.
2 See F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 268, and n. 72 (1982
ed.).
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States." Ibid. North Dakota's original Constitution contained, in identical terms, the required jurisdictional disclaimers. See N. D. Const., Art. XVI, §203, cl. 2 (1889).
Federal restrictions on North Dakota's jurisdiction over
Indian country, however, were substantially eliminated in
1953 with the enactment of the aforementioned Pub. L. 280.
See generally Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439
U. S.463, 471-474 (1979). 3 Sections 2 and 4 of Pub. L. 280
gave five States full jurisdiction, with a stated minor exception as to each of two States, over civil and criminal actions
involving Indians and arising in Indian country. 67 Stat.
588-589, codified, as amended, at 18 U. S. C. § 1162 and 28
U. S. C. § 1360, respectively. Sections 6 and 7 gave all
other States the option of assuming similar jurisdiction.
Section 6 authorized States whose constitutions and statutes
contained federally imposed jurisdictional restraints, like
North Dakota's, to amend their laws to assume jurisdiction.
67 Stat. 590, codified, as amended, at 25 U. S. C. § 1324.
Section 7 provided similar federal consent to any other State
not having civil and criminal jurisdiction, but required such
States to assume jurisdiction through "affirmative legislative
action." 67 Stat. 590. As originally enacted, Pub. L. 280
did not require States to obtain the consent of affected Indian
tribes before assuming jurisdiction over them. Title IV of
the Civil Rights Act of 1968 amended Pub. L. 280, however,
to require that all subsequent assertions of jurisdiction be
preceded by tribal consent. Pub. L. 90-284, §§401, 402,
406, 82 Stat. 78-80, codified at 25 U. S. C. §§ 1321, 1322,
1326.
Even before North Dakota moved to amend its Constitution and assume full jurisdiction under Pub. L. 280, the
North Dakota Supreme Court had taken an expansive view
of the scope of state-court jurisdiction over Indians in Indian
'Before that, however, Congress had vested North Dakota with certain
criminal jurisdiction over the Devils Lake Reservation. Act of May 31,
1946, ch. 279, 60 Stat. 229.
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country. In 1957, the court held that the existing jurisdictional disclaimers in the Enabling Act and the State's Constitution foreclosed civil jurisdiction over Indian country only
in cases involving interests in Indian lands themselves. Vermillion v. Spotted Elk, 85 N. W. 2d 432. The following
year, 1958, North Dakota amended its Constitution to authorize its legislature to "provid[e] for the acceptance of such
jurisdiction [over Indian country] as may be delegated to the
State by Act of Congress." N. D. Const., Art. XIII, § 1,
cl. 2. Finally, in 1963, the North Dakota Legislature enacted Chapter 27-19, the principal section of which provides:
"In accordance with the provisions of Public Law 280
...and [the amended] North Dakota constitution, jurisdiction of the state of North Dakota shall be extended
over all civil causes of action which arise on an Indian
reservation upon acceptance by Indian citizens in a manner provided by this chapter. Upon acceptance the jurisdiction of the state shall be to the same extent that the
state has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action,
and those civil laws of this state that are of general application to private property shall have the same force and
effect within such Indian reservation or Indian country
as they have elsewhere within this state." N. D. Cent.
Code § 27-19-01 (1974).
On their face, both the 1958 amendment to the North Dakota Constitution and Chapter 27-19 appear to expand preexisting state jurisdiction over Indian country rather than to
contract it. In In re Whiteshield, 124 N. W. 2d 694 (1963),
however, the North Dakota Supreme Court reached the conclusion that Chapter 27-19 actually disclaimed all jurisdiction
over claims arising in Indian country absent Indian consent.
In subsequent decisions, that court adhered to its general
view that without Indian consent "the State has no jurisdiction over any civil cause arising on an Indian reservation in
this State." White Eagle v. Dorgan, 209 N. W. 2d 621, 623
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(1973).1 In each case in which the North Dakota Supreme
Court declined to recognize jurisdiction, however, the defendant was an Indian; the court never had held squarely that
an Indian could not maintain an action against a non-Indian in
state court for a claim arising in Indian country.5
C. Respondent's motion to dismiss rested on the restrictive jurisdictional principles of Whiteshield and its successors. Because the petitioner Tribe at no point has consented
to state-court jurisdiction under Chapter 27-19 over the Fort
Berthold Reservation, respondent argued that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction over petitioner's claim under Chapter
27-19 and the amended provisions of Pub. L. 280. Petitioner opposed respondent's motion to dismiss on the ground,
inter alia, that the tribal consent requirements of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968 were not meant to apply to a suit brought
by a tribal government like petitioner. The trial court
rejected petitioner's arguments and granted the motion to
dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction, but did so without
prejudice to a renewal of the action following compliance
with the state and federal consent requirements. App. to
Pet. for Cert. la.
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed.
321 N. W. 2d 510 (1982). Petitioner argued that the jurisdiction recognized in Vermillion had not been extinguished
altogether and that the North Dakota courts possessed
"residuary jurisdiction" over a claim by an Indian against a
non-Indian following the enactment of Pub. L. 280 and the
Civil Rights Act of 1968. The court rejected this argument,
adhering instead to its conclusion in Nelson v. Dubois, 232
'In Gourneau v. Smith, 207 N. W. 2d 256, 258 (1973), the court ex-

pressly held that Vermillion "no longer states the rule to be applied...
in a case between Indians arising out of use of the public highways on an
Indian reservation."
I In United States ex rel. Hall v. Hansen, 303 N. W. 2d 349, 350, and
n. 3 (1981), however, the court did state in dictum that a state trial court
lacked jurisdiction over a claim by an Indian against a non-Indian arising in
Indian country.
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N. W. 2d 54 (1975), that any residuary jurisdiction was preempted by the tribal consent requirements contained in the
Civil Rights Act of 1968. After reviewing the history of
North Dakota's jurisdiction over Indian country, the court
reaffirmed its prior holdings, observing that "we have no
jurisdiction over civil causes of action arising within the
exterior boundaries of an Indian reservation, unless the Indian citizens of the reservation vote to accept jurisdiction."
321 N. W. 2d, at 512.
The court also rejected petitioner's argument that to prohibit an Indian plaintiff from suing a non-Indian in state court
for a claim arising on an Indian reservation would violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
deny petitioner equal access to the courts, in violation of the
North Dakota Constitution.6 The court relied on Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U. S. 463 (1979), in which
this Court rejected an equal protection challenge to a state
jurisdictional statute that relied on tribal classifications. In
Yakima Indian Nation the Court held that the unique legal
status of Indian tribes under federal law permitted the Federal Government to single out tribal Indians in ways that
otherwise might be unconstitutional, and that the state jurisdictional statute at issue there was insulated from strict
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause because it was
enacted under the authority of Pub. L. 280. 439 U. S., at
499-502. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded:
"Likewise, the people of North Dakota and the legislature
were acting under explicit authority granted by Congress in
the exercise of its federal power over Indians when our Con' "All courts shall be open, and every man for any injury done him in his
lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due process of
law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay."
N. D. Const., Art. I, § 9. The State's Constitution further provides that
no citizen or class of citizens "shall ... be granted privileges or immunities
which upon the same terms shall not be granted to all citizens." Art. I,
§ 21.
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stitution was amended and Chapter 27-19 ...was enacted."
321 N. W. 2d, at 513. As a result, any discrimination
against Indian litigants did not violate the State or Federal
Constitutions. Ibid.
Because of the complexity and importance of the issue
posed by the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision, we
granted certiorari. 461 U. S.904 (1983).
II
Respondent does not dispute that petitioner's claim comes
within the scope of the civil jurisdiction recognized by the
North Dakota court in its Vermillion ruling in 1957. Respondent advances two arguments in support of the North
Dakota Supreme Court's conclusion that state-court jurisdiction no longer extends so far. The first is that federal law
precludes the state courts from asserting jurisdiction over
petitioner's claim. The second is that, regardless of federal
law, the North Dakota Supreme Court has held that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction as a matter of state law. We
address these arguments in turn.
A
Although this Court has departed from the rigid demarcation of state and tribal authority laid down in 1832 in Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, the assertion of state authority
over tribal reservations remains subject to "two independent
but related barriers." White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker, 448 U. S. 136, 142 (1980). First, a particular exercise of state authority may be foreclosed because it would
undermine "'the right of reservation Indians to make their
own laws and be ruled by them."' Ibid., quoting Williams
v. Lee, 358 U. S., at 220. Second, state authority may be
pre-empted by incompatible federal law. White Mountain,
448 U. S., at 142. Accord, New Mexico v. MescaleroApache
Tribe, 462 U. S. 324, 334, and n. 16 (1983); Ramah Navajo
School Board, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U. S. 832,
837-838 (1982); McClanahanv. Arizona State Tax Comm'n,
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411 U. S. 164, 179 (1973). We do not believe that either of
these barriers precludes North Dakota courts from entertaining a civil action by an Indian tribe against a non-Indian for a
claim arising on an Indian reservation.
Despite respondent's arguments, we fail to see how the exercise of state-court jurisdiction in this case would interfere
with the right of tribal Indians to govern themselves under
their own laws. To be sure, the full breadth of state-court
jurisdiction recognized in Vermillion cannot be squared with
principles of tribal autonomy; to the extent that Vermillion
permitted North Dakota state courts to exercise jurisdiction
over claims by non-Indians against Indians or over claims
between Indians, it intruded impermissibly on tribal selfgovernance. See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U. S. 382
(1976); Williams v. Lee, supra. This Court, however, repeatedly has approved the exercise of jurisdiction by state
courts over claims by Indians against non-Indians, even when
those claims arose in Indian country. See McClanahan v.
Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S., at 173 (dictum);
Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U. S. 365 (1968); Williams
v. Lee, 358 U. S., at 219 (dictum); United States v. Candelaria,271 U. S. 432, 444 (1926); Felix v. Patrick, 145 U. S.
317, 332 (1892); Fellows v. Blacksmith, 19 How. 366 (1857).1
The interests implicated in such cases are very different from
those present in Williams v. Lee, where a non-Indian sued an
Indian in state court for debts incurred in Indian country, or
in Fisher v. District Court, where this Court held that a
tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction over an adoption proceeding in which all parties were tribal Indians residing on a
reservation. As a general matter, tribal self-government is
not impeded when a State allows an Indian to enter its courts
I A number of state courts have recognized the right of Indians to bring
suits in state courts against non-Indians for claims arising in Indian country. See, e. g., McCrea v. Busch, 164 Mont. 442, 524 P. 2d 781 (1974);
Paiz v. Hughes, 76 N. M. 562, 417 P. 2d 51 (1966); Whiting v. Hoffine, 294
N. W. 2d 921, 923-924 (S.D. 1980).
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on equal terms with other persons to seek relief against a
non-Indian concerning a claim arising in Indian country.
The exercise of state jurisdiction is particularly compatible
with tribal autonomy when, as here, the suit is brought by
the tribe itself and the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over
the claim at the time the suit was instituted.
Neither are we persuaded that the exercise of state jurisdiction here would be inconsistent with the federal and tribal
interests reflected in North Dakota's Enabling Act or in Pub.
L. 280. As for the disclaimer provisions of the Enabling
Act, the presence or absence of specific jurisdictional disclaimers rarely has had controlling significance in this Court's
past decisions about state jurisdiction over Indian affairs or
activities on Indian lands. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache
Tribe, 463 U. S. 545, 562 (1983); see F. Cohen, Handbook
of Federal Indian Law 268 (1982 ed.). 8 In this case, the
sparse legislative record suggests only that the Enabling
Act's phrase "absolute [congressional] jurisdiction and control" was meant to foreclose state regulation and taxation of
Indians and their lands, not that Indians were to be prohibited from entering state courts to pursue judicial remedies
against non-Indians. See H. R. Rep. No. 1025, 50th Cong.,
1st Sess., 8-9, 24 (1888). To the extent that the disclaimer
language of the Enabling Act may be regarded as ambiguous,
moreover, it is a settled principle of statutory construction
that statutes passed for the benefit of dependent Indian
tribes are to be liberally construed, with doubtful expressions
being resolved in favor of the Indians. See, e. g., Bryan v.
Itasca County, 426 U. S. 373, 392 (1976); Alaska Pacific
Fisheriesv. United States, 248 U. S. 78, 89 (1918). It would
be contrary to this principle to resolve any ambiguity in the
I In Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U. S. 60, 71 (1962), this
Court held that the phrase "absolute jurisdiction and control" was not
intended to oust States completely from all authority concerning Indian
lands. See, however, McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411
U. S. 164, 176, n. 15 (1973).
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language of the Enabling Act in favor of a construction under
which North Dakota could not provide a judicial forum for an
Indian to obtain relief against a non-Indian.
We also cannot subscribe to the view that Pub. L. 280
either required North Dakota to disclaim the basic jurisdiction recognized in Vermillion or authorized it to do so. This
Court previously has recognized that Pub. L. 280 was intended to facilitate rather than to impede the transfer of jurisdictional authority to the States. Washington v. Yakima
Indian Nation, 439 U. S., at 490; see also Bryan v. Itasca
County, 426 U. S., at 383-390. Nothing in the language or
legislative history of Pub. L. 280 indicates that it was meant
to divest States of pre-existing and otherwise lawfully assumed jurisdiction.9 Section 6 of the federal statute authorized a State whose enabling Act and constitution contained
jurisdictional disclaimers "to remove any legal impediment to
the assumptionof civil and criminal jurisdiction" (emphasis
added). 67 Stat. 590, codified, as amended, at 25 U. S. C.
§ 1324. Similarly, § 7 gave congressional consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by any other State "not having jurisdiction." 67 Stat. 590. By their terms, therefore, both § 6
and § 7 were designed to eliminate obstacles to the assumption of jurisdiction rather than to require pre-existing jurisdiction to be disclaimed. Although the Civil Rights Act of
1968 amended Pub. L. 280 by adding tribal consent requirements, those requirements were not made retroactive; 1othe
1968 amendments therefore did not displace jurisdiction pre'Although Vermillion was decided after the enactment of Pub. L. 280,
the North Dakota Supreme Court made clear that it was confirming preexisting jurisdiction rather than establishing a previously unavailable jurisdictional category. See Vermillion v. Spotted Elk, 85 N. W. 2d, at
435-436.
"0See 25 U. S. C. §§ 1321(a), 1322(a), 1326; S. Rep. No. 721, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess., 32 (1967) (additional views of Sen. Ervin); Goldberg, Public Law
280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA
L. Rev. 535, 551 (1975).
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viously assumed under Pub. L. 280, much less jurisdiction assumed prior to and apart from Pub. L. 280. Similarly, while
Pub. L. 280 authorized States to assume partial rather than
full civil jurisdiction, see Washington v. Yakima Indian
Nation, 439 U. S., at 493-499, nothing in Pub. L. 280 purports to authorize States to disclaim pre-existing jurisdiction.
Indeed, the Civil Rights Act of 1968 granted States the authority to retrocede jurisdiction acquired under Pub. L. 280
precisely because Pub. L. 280 itself did not authorize such
jurisdictional disclaimers. 1
In sum, then, no federal law or policy required the North
Dakota courts to forgo the jurisdiction recognized in Vermillion in this case. If the North Dakota Supreme Court's
jurisdictional ruling is to stand, it must be shown to rest on
state rather than federal law.
B
This Court concededly has no authority to revise the North
Dakota Supreme Court's interpretation of state jurisdictional
law. Only last Term, in Arizona v. San Carlos Apache
Tribe, supra, we noted that "to the extent that a claimed bar
to state jurisdiction ...

is premised on the respective State

Constitutions, that is a question of state law over which the
state courts have binding authority." 463 U. S., at 561.
That principle is equally applicable, of course, with respect to
jurisdictional bars grounded in state statutes. If the North
Dakota Supreme Court's decision that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction in this case rested solely on state law, the only
remaining issue before this Court would be petitioner's argu"See 25 U. S. C. § 1323(a); 2 U. S. Dept. of Interior, Opinions of the
Solicitor Relating to Indian Affairs, 1917-1974, pp. 1951-1952 (1979); see
also Goldberg, supra, at 558-562. Although any assumption of jurisdiction pursuant to Pub. L. 280 must comply with that statute's procedural
requirements, see Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U. S.423
(1971), Pub. L. 280's requirements simply have no bearing on jurisdiction
lawfully assumed prior to its enactment.
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ment that the jurisdictional disclaimer here violates petitioner's federal constitutional rights. 2
It is equally well established, however, that this Court retains a role when a state court's interpretation of state law
has been influenced by an accompanying interpretation of
federal law. In some instances, a state court may construe
state law narrowly to avoid a perceived conflict with federal
statutory or constitutional requirements. See, e. g., United
Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 410 U. S. 623, 630-632 (1973); State
Tax Comm'n v. Van Cott, 306 U. S. 511, 513-515 (1939); Red
Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U. S. 109, 120 (1924);
see also San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 353
U. S. 26 (1957). In others, in contrast, the state court may
construe state law broadly in the belief that federal law poses
no barrier to the exercise of state authority. See, e. g.,
Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U. S. 481 (1942). In both
categories of cases, this Court has reviewed the federal question on which the state-law determination appears to have
been premised. If the state court has proceeded on an incorrect perception of federal law, it has been this Court's practice to vacate the judgment of the state court and remand the
case so that the court may reconsider the state-law question
free of misapprehensions about the scope of federal law. 13
"The United States and the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians,
each of whom has filed a brief amicus curiae in support of petitioner, suggest that Chapter 27-19 may violate 42 U. S. C. § 1981 to the extent that it
precludes petitioner from maintaining its action in state court. Section
1981 provides in relevant part: "All persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory ...
to sue ... as is enjoyed by white citizens." Petitioner does not appear to

have relied on § 1981 before the North Dakota Supreme Court, nor has it
done so here. In light of our disposition of this case, we need not decide
whether the § 1981 issue is properly before us or, if so, whether a violation
of § 1981 has been made out. The Supreme Court of North Dakota is free,
of course, to consider the applicability of § 1981 on remand if it deems the
issue to be properly before it.
" See 28 U. S. C. § 2106. In United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, for example, two justices of the Illinois Supreme Court had construed a state tax
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Here, a careful reading of the North Dakota Supreme
Court's opinion leaves us far from certain that the court's
present interpretation of Chapter 27-19 does not rest on a
misconception of federal law. In determining the role played
by that court's understanding of federal law, we are guided
by the jurisdictional principles that have come to govern our
calculation of adequate and independent state grounds. In
Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032 (1983), this Court ruled
that "when ... a state court decision fairly appears ...to be

interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and
independence of any possible state law ground is not clear
from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the
way it did because it believed that federal law required it to
do so." Id., at 1040-1041. Although petitioner's constitutional challenge to the North Dakota Supreme Court's
judgment means that we do not face a question of our own
jurisdiction, see Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U. S., at
482-483, we believe that the same general interpretive principles properly apply here. The North Dakota Supreme
Court's opinion does state that the North Dakota Legislature
"totally disclaimed jurisdiction over civil causes of action arising on an Indian reservation," but it adds that the legislature
did so "pursuant to Public Law 280," "[u]nder the authority
of Public Law 280," and "under explicit authority granted by
Congress in the exercise of its federal power over Indians."
321 N. W. 2d, at 511, 513. There are at least two respects
in which these references and other language in the court's
opinion leave it far less than clear that the North Dakota
statute to avoid a perceived conflict with the dormant Commerce Clause.
This Court held that the interpretation forgone by the Illinois Supreme
Court would not have run afoul of the Commerce Clause, and therefore remanded the case "to avoid the risk of 'an affirmance of a decision which
might have been decided differently if the court below had felt free, under
our decisions, to do so."' 410 U. S., at 632, quoting Perkins v. Benguet
ConsolidatedMining Co., 342 U. S.437, 443 (1952).
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Supreme Court's interpretation of Chapter 27-19 was not
influenced by its understanding of federal law.
First, the court's treatment of petitioner's constitutional
claims strongly suggests that the court's underlying interpretation of Chapter 27-19 would have been different if the court
had realized from the outset that federal law does not insulate the present jurisdictional disclaimer from state and
federal constitutional scrutiny. While we express no view
about the merits of petitioner's federal equal protection challenge, we note that the North Dakota Supreme Court rejected petitioner's state and federal constitutional claims not
because it viewed them as otherwise meritless, but because
"the people of North Dakota and the legislature were acting
under explicit authority granted by Congress in the exercise
of its federal power over Indians" in disclaiming state jurisdiction. 321 N. W. 2d, at 513. The court had proceeded on
a similar assumption before; in Gourneau v. Smith, 207
N. W. 2d 256 (1973), for example, the court rejected an Indian plaintiff's jurisdictional claim based on the "open courts"
provision of N. D. Const. Art. I, § 9, because the tribal consent requirements of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 were taken
to foreclose jurisdiction:
"The courts of the State of North Dakota are open to
all persons. But ... Federal law prohibits State courts
from assuming jurisdiction of civil actions involving Indians which arise on an Indian reservation, until such time
as the Indians of that reservation have consented to such
jurisdiction. Thus the courts of the State of North Dakota are open to Indians, if they consent to the courts'
jurisdiction as provided by law." 207 N. W. 2d, at 259.
The assumption that Pub. L. 280 and the Civil Rights Act
of 1968 either authorized North Dakota to disclaim jurisdiction or affirmatively forbade the exercise of jurisdiction absent tribal consent is incorrect, for the reasons given above.
That assumption, however, appears to have been the sole
basis relied on by the North Dakota Supreme Court to avoid
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holding the jurisdictional disclaimer unconstitutional as
applied in this case. Because the North Dakota Supreme
Court has adhered consistently to the policy of construing
state statutes to avoid potential state and federal constitutional problems, see, e. g., State v. Kottenbroch, 319 N. W.
2d 465, 473 (1982); Paluck v. Board of County Comm'rs, 307
N. W. 2d 852, 856 (1981); Grace Lutheran Church v. North
Dakota Employment Security Bureau, 294 N. W. 2d 767,
772 (1980); North American Coal Corp. v. Huber, 268 N. W.
2d 593, 596 (1978); Tang v. Ping, 209 N. W. 2d 624, 628
(1973), it is entirely possible that the court would have
avoided any constitutional question by construing Chapter
27-19 not to disclaim jurisdiction here, and it is equally possible that the court will reconstrue Chapter 27-19 that way if it
is given an opportunity to do so.
Second, the manner in which the court rejected the availability of "residuary jurisdiction" leaves open the possibility
that, despite the court's references to state law, the court
regarded federal law as an affirmative bar to the exercise of
jurisdiction here. The court stated:
"In essence, [petitioner] argues that North Dakota retained residuary jurisdiction over actions brought by
Indians against non-Indians for civil wrongs committed
on Indian lands. . . . That argument would be more
convincing had the legislature of North Dakota not, pursuant to Public Law 280, totally disclaimed jurisdiction
over civil causes of action arising on an Indian reservation. In re Whiteshield, 124 N. W. 2d 694 (N. D. 1963).
In Nelson v. Dubois, 232 N. W. 2d 54 (N. D. 1975), . . .
we rejected the concept of 'residuary'jurisdiction. We
adhere to that decision today." 321 N. W. 2d, at 511
(emphasis added).
The court's reliance on Nelson v. Dubois is suggestive because Dubois itself turned aside an attempt to invoke statecourt jurisdiction over Indian country on the ground that
federal law barred the exercise of jurisdiction. Specifically,
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the court held that it did not have "residuary jurisdiction"
over a suit by non-Indians against Indians, even if the exercise of jurisdiction were assumed not to infringe on tribal
self-governance under Williams v. Lee, because the tribal
consent provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 pre-empted
any exercise of state jurisdiction except in accordance with
the terms of that Act. 232 N. W. 2d, at 57-59. The court
recognized that its holding deprived the plaintiffs of any
forum for their suit, but added: "The solution to this most
serious problem lies not with the State. Congress may
amend its statutes; Indian tribes of this State may begin
to assert their own jurisdiction. This State cannot exercise
jurisdiction that it does not possess." Id., at 59.11
As noted above, the Civil Rights Act of 1968 in no way bars
the exercise of jurisdiction in this case. The court's reliance
on Nelson v. Dubois to dismiss petitioner's jurisdictional

14 The court has made even more clear in other cases its view

that Pub. L.
280, as amended by the 1968 Civil Rights Act, is an affirmative constraint
on state jurisdiction. For example, in Schantz v. White Lightning, 231
N. W. 2d 812, 815-816 (1975), the court stated:
"[Any change from the present [jurisdictional] case law would require action by the United States Congress. The appellants are asking this court
to assume the duties and responsibilities which are vested solely in the
United States Congress. The arguments presented should be addressed
to that body.
"The Congress has set out the mandatory procedure to be followed by the
Indian Tribes and the State before the States may assume jurisdiction. ...
The Sioux Indians, not having accepted State jurisdiction as permitted and
provided for by the congressional mandate and Chapter 27-19, we conclude
that the State did not have, nor did it acquire, jurisdiction" (emphasis
added).
See United States ex rel. Hall v. Hansen, 303 N. W. 2d, at 350; Nelson v.
Dubois, 232 N. W. 2d, at 61 (dissenting opinion); Gourneau v. Smith, 207
N. W. 2d, at 259; see also Poitra v. Demarrias, 502 F. 2d 23, 27 (CA8
1974), cert. denied, 421 U. S.934 (1975); American Indian Agricultural
Credit Consortium, Inc. v. Fredericks, 551 F. Supp. 1020, 1021-1022
(Colo. 1982).
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claim suggests, however, that the court was proceeding on a

contrary premise. In that event, it may well have adopted
a restrictive interpretation of Chapter 27-19 to avoid a perceived conflict between state and federal jurisdictional man-

dates. 5 By the same token, Nelson v. Dubois itself suggests
that the court might recognize some measure of "residuary
jurisdiction" here but for the mistaken belief that a federal
jurisdictional impediment exists. Because we cannot exclude this possibility with any degree of confidence, the
prudent course is to give the North Dakota Supreme Court
an opportunity to express its views on Chapter 27-19 and
thereby "avoid the risk of 'an affirmance of a decision which
might have been decided differently if the court below had
felt free, under our decisions, to do so."' United Air Lines,
Inc. v. Mahin, 410 U. S., at 632, quoting Perkins v. Benguet
ConsolidatedMining Co., 342 U. S. 437, 443 (1952).
Our conclusion that the North Dakota Supreme Court's
state-law decision may well have rested on federal law is buttressed by prudential considerations. Were we not to give
the North Dakota Supreme Court an opportunity to reconsider its conclusions with the proper understanding of federal
law, we would be required to decide whether North Dakota
has denied petitioner equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment by excluding it from state courts in a circumstance in which a non-Indian would be allowed to maintain a
suit. It is a fundamental rule of judicial restraint, however,
that this Court will not reach constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them. See, e. g., Leroy
5

1In at least one instance, the North Dakota Supreme Court took care
not to extend its restrictive jurisdictional holdings to the situation in which
an Indian plaintiff brought suit against a non-Indian defendant in state
court. See Schantz v. White Lightning, 231 N. W. 2d, at 814, n. 1 (rejecting broad formulation of jurisdictional issue because it "would require the

consideration of a question if an Indian could sue a non-Indian"). The
court also once stated flatly that "Indians have the right to sue non-Indians
in State courts." Rolette County v. Eltobgi, 221 N. W. 2d 645, 648 (1974).
But see n. 5, supra.
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v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U. S. 173, 181 (1979);
Massachusetts v. Westcott, 431 U. S. 322, 323 (1977); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625, 633 (1972); Ashwander
v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 346-348 (1936) (concurring opinion);
see also Whalen v. United States, 445 U. S. 684, 702 (1980)
(REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). This Court has relied on that
principle in similar circumstances to resolve doubts about the
independence of state-law decisions in favor of an interpretation that avoids a constitutional question. See, e. g., Black
v. CutterLaboratories,351 U. S. 292, 299 (1956). The same
prudential rule is properly employed in this case. If the
North Dakota Supreme Court reinterprets Chapter 27-19 to

permit petitioner to maintain its claim in the state courts, or
if it concludes that Chapter 27-19 violates the State's Constitution insofar as it bars jurisdiction in this case, neither
that court nor this one will be required finally to reach petitioner's federal constitutional challenge.

Under these cir-

cumstances, our responsibility to avoid unnecessary constitutional adjudication demands that we resolve any uncertainty
over the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision in favor of

the possibility that it was influenced by a misunderstanding
of federal law.1"
6

1In addition, the practical cost of mistakenly concluding that federal law
influenced the North Dakota Supreme Court's treatment of Chapter 27-19
is far outweighed by the cost of mistakenly reaching the opposite conclusion. If the court's misunderstanding of Pub. L. 280 in fact did not contribute to its interpretation of state law, the court is free to reinstate its
former judgment on remand. See, e. g., United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin,
54 Ill. 2d 431, 298 N. E. 2d 161 (1973). In contrast, if the court's understanding of federal law did play a role in its interpretation of Chapter 27-19
but we were to proceed on a contrary assumption, we would be depriving
petitioner of a judicial forum that the North Dakota Supreme Court would
make available if only it were given another opportunity to address the
issue. When the cost of erring in one direction is so negligible and the
cost of erring in the other is so great, we think that uncertainty about
the federal basis for the state-law decision properly is resolved in favor
of the conclusion that federal law played a material role.
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III
It is important to recognize what we have not decided in

this case today. We have made no ruling that Chapter 27-19
has any meaning other than the one assigned to it by the
North Dakota Supreme Court. Neither have we decided
whether, assuming that the North Dakota Supreme Court
adheres to its current interpretation of Chapter 27-19, application of the statute to petitioner will deny petitioner federal
equal protection or violate any other federally protected
right. Finally, we have intimated no view concerning the
state trial court's jurisdiction over respondent's counterclaim
should the North Dakota Supreme Court decide that the trial
court does have jurisdiction over petitioner's claim. Instead, we merely vacate the North Dakota Supreme Court's
judgment and remand the case for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST,

with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins,

dissenting.

The highest state court in North Dakota has made a decision on the scope of state-court jurisdiction, a decision based
on a state statute passed following amendment of the State
Constitution. The question is clearly one of state law, immune from our review except in so far as it might be preempted by federal law or in conflict with the United States
Constitution. The Court today does not say that Chapter
27-19, as interpreted by the North Dakota Supreme Court, is
pre-empted by federal law. Nor does the Court find that
statute unconstitutional.

Yet the Court vacates the judg-

ment below because Pub. L. 280 neither "authorized" nor
"required" any disclaimer of pre-existing state jurisdiction.
I do not disagree with the Court's essay on the purpose
and effect of Pub. L. 280. But I fail to see its relevance
to the state-law issues decided by the court below. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the North Dakota court

OCTOBER TERM, 1983
REHNQUIST, J., dissenting

467 U. S.

because the only federal question actually before us-the
constitutionality of North Dakota's refusal to exercise jurisdiction over a lawsuit brought by an Indian tribe-is
insubstantial.
In Part II-A of its opinion, the Court argues that statecourt jurisdiction over this case would have been proper, as a
matter of both federal and North Dakota law, prior to the
passage of Pub. L. 280 and that nothing in Pub. L. 280 should
have changed that situation. In Part II-B, the Court parlays the eclipse of this "residual jurisdiction" into a reason
for concluding that the North Dakota Supreme Court may
have misunderstood Pub. L. 280 when it interpreted Chapter
27-19. The linchpin of the entire argument is the 1957 case
of Vermillion v. Spotted Elk, 85 N. W. 2d 432, in which the
North Dakota court took an expansive view of the scope of
state-court jurisdiction over suits by and against Indians in
Indian country. The Court today correctly states that the
jurisdiction claimed in Vermillion-over all civil actions arising in Indian country, except those involving interests in Indian lands-would embrace this case. Ante, at 147. But
the argument for residual jurisdiction which the Court constructs around Vermillion is wholly untenable for the simple

reason that the expansive jurisdiction of Vermillion was
discredited, two years after it was claimed, by our decision
in Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217 (1959).
Both the specific holding and the broad dictum of Vermillion were pre-empted by Williams v. Lee.' The North Dakota court exercised jurisdiction in Vermillion over a suit
arising out of a car accident on an Indian reservation in which
all the parties were reservation Indians. The principles of
tribal autonomy recognized in Williams v. Lee clearly preIn Williams, a non-Indian who operated a store on an Indian reservation in Arizona sued an Indian couple to collect goods sold to them on
credit. We held that principles of tribal autonomy precluded the Arizona
courts from entertaining the suit in the absence of an affirmative assumption of jurisdiction by the state legislature. 358 U. S., at 222.
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clude such an intrusion into strictly tribal affairs without
affirmative legislative action pursuant to Pub. L. 280. See
Fisherv. DistrictCourt, 424 U. S. 382 (1976). And the expansive claim made in Vermillion to jurisdiction over all civil
actions arising in Indian country, except those involving interests in Indian lands, cannot be squared with the requirement that such jurisdiction be assumed by legislative action
pursuant to Pub. L. 280.
In short, at the time Chapter 27-19 was passed, four years
after Williams v. Lee, Vermillion was not in any sense good
law. The "lawfully assumed jurisdiction," ante, at 150,
which the Court thinks must have survived both Pub. L. 280
and Chapter 27-19, was in fact unlawfully assumed and
therefore invalid. The fact that Chapter 27-19 appears to
expand state jurisdiction over Indian country rather than to
contract it must be understood, not in light of Vermillion,
but in light of the intervening, superseding decision of this
Court in Williams v. Lee. The North Dakota Legislature
was effectively starting from "square one" in asserting jurisdiction over civil actions in Indian country when it passed
Chapter 27-19. Thus, since the assumption of jurisdiction
in Chapter 27-19 was predicated on tribal consent, which
has not been forthcoming, the North Dakota Supreme Court
could naturally and properly conclude that there was no statecourt jurisdiction in this case. 2
The Court glosses over this obvious difficulty in its argument by simply recasting Vermillion to fit its needs.
"To be sure the full breadth of state-court jurisdiction
recognized in Vermillion cannot be squared with principles of tribal autonomy; to the extent that Vermillion
permitted North Dakota state courts to exercise jurisdiction over claims by non-Indians against Indians or
'In Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U. S. 463, 495 (1979),
we held that "any option State can condition the assumption of full jurisdiction on the consent of an affected tribe" even though not required to do so by

Pub. L. 280.
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over claims between Indians, it intruded impermissibly
on tribal self-governance.

. . .

This Court, however,

repeatedly has approved the exercise of jurisdiction by
state courts over claims by Indians against non-Indians,
even when those claims arose in Indian country." Ante,
at 148.
In accordance with its view of what the North Dakota courts
could have done compatibly with federal law, the Court proceeds to treat Vermillion as if it had in fact only claimed
jurisdiction over suits by Indians against non-Indians. Thus,
the Court says that nothing in Pub. L. 280 "required North
Dakota to disclaim the basic jurisdiction recognized in Vermillion or authorized it to do so," ante, at 150, and that "no
federal law or policy required the North Dakota courts to
forgo the jurisdiction recognized in Vermillion in this case,"
ante, at 151. The Court even refers to the jurisdiction of
Vermillion as "otherwise lawfully assumed jurisdiction."
Ante, at 150.
I must confess to being nonplussed by the Court's treatment of Vermillion. It seems strange, indeed, to suppose
that Vermillion is in some sense good law-when neither its
holding nor its reasoning is acceptable under federal lawmerely because the opinion would be acceptable if it had been
written altogether differently and reached an opposite result.
The fact remains that it was not written differently and did
not reach the opposite result.
The North Dakota court improperly tried to assert jurisdiction over all civil actions arising in Indian country, except
those involving interests in Indian lands. That attempt having failed, there is no indication that North Dakota would
have accepted the one-way jurisdiction sought by petitioner
in this case, whereby Indians can sue non-Indians but not
vice versa. And the fact that our cases would have permitted the assumption of such jurisdiction is simply beside the
point. Nothing in the Enabling Act, the State Constitution,
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or Pub. L. 280 compelled North Dakota to grant Indians the
right to sue non-Indians in state court in situations where

non-Indians could not sue Indians.

And it is sheer specula-

3
tion to suppose that the State would have done so.
Without Vermillion the Court's argument in Part II-B
simply crumbles. For without some sort of plausible "residual jurisdiction" that would cover this case, Pub. L. 280 constitutes an affirmative bar to the assumption of jurisdiction
by the North Dakota court. Any jurisdiction over Indian
country assumed by an option State following passage of
Pub. L. 280 must be assumed in accordance with the requirements of Pub. L. 280. It must be assumed, that is, by affirmative legislative action; state courts are powerless to act

IThe North Dakota court's subsequent treatment of Vermillion provides
a strong indication that the court would never, as a matter of state law,
have recognized the one-sided jurisdiction sought by petitioner and permitted by federal law. As noted, the jurisdiction claimed in Vermillion under
state law was invalid under Williams v. Lee as pre-empted by federal law.
That same jurisdiction was also disclaimed as a matter of state law by the
passage of Chapter 27-19. See 321 N. W. 2d 510, 511 (N. D. 1982).
Chapter 27-19 provides that "jurisdiction of the state of North Dakota
shall be extended over all civil causes of action which arise on an Indian
reservation upon acceptance by Indian citizens in a manner provided by
this chapter." N. D. Cent. Code §27-19-01 (1974). A later provision
excepts from this jurisdiction suits involving interests in Indian lands.
§ 27-19-08. Thus, the jurisdiction which North Dakota stands ready to
accept under Chapter 27-19 is exactly coterminous with that claimed in
Vermillion.
If Vermillion had been good law, Chapter 27-19 would have been entirely superfluous. Following the passage of Chapter 27-19, therefore,
the North Dakota court could reasonably conclude that the legislature had
disclaimed (i. e., renounced any claim to) the jurisdiction wrongfully
usurped in Vermillion except on consent of the affected tribes. And the
fact that the court concluded that all the jurisdiction of Vermillion had
been disclaimed indicates that, as a matter of state law, the court views the
jurisdiction of Vermillion as an all-or-nothing, reciprocal proposition.
Again, it is irrelevant that our cases would have permitted the State to assert one-sided, residual jurisdiction. The State was not obliged to accept
the invitation.
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on their own initiative. As we stated in Kennerly v. District
Court of Montana, 400 U. S. 423, 427 (1971):
"[T]he requirement of affirmative legislative action [was
not] an idle choice of words; the legislative history of the
1953 statute shows that the requirement was intended
to assure that state jurisdiction would not be extended
until the jurisdictions to be responsible for the portion
of Indian country concerned manifested by political action their willingness and ability to discharge their new
responsibilities."
North Dakota took affirmative legislative action in passing
Chapter 27-19, but conditioned its assumption of jurisdiction
on tribal consent. Since that consent has not been forthcoming, North Dakota has not assumed any additional jurisdiction over Indian country under Pub. L. 280. See Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U. S. 463, 499 (1979).
North Dakota courts therefore have no authority to unilaterally augment their jurisdiction by entertaining suits either
by or against Indians in actions arising on Indian lands.
Fisher v. District Court, 424 U. S., at 388-389; Kennerly,
supra, at 427.1 Unless, therefore, such jurisdiction was "assumed prior to and apart from Pub. L. 280," ante, at 151, an
assumption I find untenable for the reasons given, Pub. L.
280 precludes the exercise of jurisdiction in this case.5
4

For this reason, the Court's reliance on Nelson v. Dubois, 232 N. W. 2d
54 (N. D. 1975), and Schantz v. White Lightning, 231 N. W. 2d 812 (N. D.
1975), see ante, at 155-156, and n. 14, for the proposition that the North
Dakota Supreme Court may have misread federal law is misplaced. In so
far as North Dakota has not already assumed lawful jurisdiction over suits

arising in Indian country, either prior to Pub. L. 280 or pursuant to the
terms of that statute, federal law does act "as an affirmative bar to the
exercise of jurisdiction here," ante, at 155.
1Obviously, if Pub. L. 280 would preclude a judicial assumption of jurisdiction in this case, then the North Dakota Supreme Court properly disposed of petitioner's equal protection argument with a simple citation to
Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U. S., at 500-501, in which we
rejected a similar challenge to a Washington statute which conditioned
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I might finally add that even if one did posit a truncated
Vermillion as somehow providing the residual jurisdiction
necessary to the Court's argument until eclipsed by the
North Dakota Legislature, there is still no indication and the
Court offers no good reason to believe that the North Dakota
Supreme Court interpreted Chapter 27-19 under any misapprehensions about Pub. L. 280. The North Dakota court
in fact shows a perfectly clear appreciation of both the purpose and effect of Pub. L. 280.
"The purpose of Public Law 280 was to facilitate the
transfer of jurisdictional responsibility to the states.
Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes, 439
U. S. 463, 505 (1979). It permitted states to amend
their constitutions or existing statutes to remove any
legal impediments to the assumption of civil and criminal
jurisdiction, and thereby to unilaterally assume jurisdiction over criminal and civil matters within the exterior
boundaries of Indian reservations within the states taking such action." 321 N. W. 2d 510, 511 (1982).
This statement of the law is unexceptionable. Indeed, the
Court's own statement of the purpose and effect of Pub. L.
280, see ante, at 150, reads like a paraphrase of the above
passage.
The North Dakota court never even remotely implies that
Pub. L. 280 "required" the State to eliminate any preexisting, lawfully assumed jurisdiction. The focus is rather
on the passage of Chapter 27-19 by the state legislature. See
n. 3, supra. And as to whether the court may have mistakenly thought that Pub. L. 280 "authorized" such a disclaimer
of jurisdiction by the State, I cannot see how that question is
relevant at all. Either a disclaimer of pre-existing jurisdiction was forbidden by federal law or it was not. If not, and
state jurisdiction over Indian lands in some subject-matter areas on Indian
consent. It would also follow that the lower court's handling of the equal
protection claim does not, as the Court would have it, ante, at 154, reflect
any misunderstanding of federal law.
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the majority does not imply that it was, then there is no additional requirement that it be affirmatively sanctioned. A
State is not obliged to play "Mother, may I" with the Federal
Government before retroceding jurisdiction that, under our
cases, could have been retained.
In my view, therefore, the only federal question presented
in this case is whether North Dakota's failure to permit Indians to sue non-Indians in circumstances under which nonIndians could not sue Indians violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. After our decision in Washington v. Yakima
Indian Nation, supra, that question is not a substantial one.
See n. 5, supra. Access to the North Dakota courts is within
the power of petitioner. The Tribe need merely consent
to the full civil jurisdiction which North Dakota, pursuant to
Pub. L. 280, stands ready to offer them. Petitioner wants to
enjoy the full benefits of the state courts as plaintiff without
ever running the risk of appearing as defendant. The Equal
Protection Clause mandates no such result.
I respectfully dissent.

